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8  Meteorology
Monte Ransome Johnson
Greco- Roman meteorology will be described in four overlapping 
developments. In the archaic period, astro- meteorological calendars 
were written down, and one appears in Hesiod’s Works and Days; 
such calendars or almanacs originated thousands of years earlier in 
Mesopotamia.1 In the second development, also in the archaic period, 
the pioneers of prose writing began writing speculative naturalistic 
explanations of meteorological phenomena:  Anaximander, followed 
by Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and others. When Aristotle in the fourth 
century BCE mentions the ‘inquiry that all our predecessors have been 
calling meteorology’ (338a26), he is referring to these writers. In the 
third development, the "rst two enterprises were combined: empirical 
data collection about meteorological phenomena began to be married to 
naturalistic theoretical explanation. This innovation was prompted by 
Democritus and synthesised in its most in#uential form by Aristotle. 
At this point more sophisticated techniques of both short- term weather 
forecasting and long- term speculation about global climate change were 
also developed. In the fourth development, the wider implications of the 
naturalistic explanation of meteorological phenomena were contested. 
The views of ‘meteorologists’ had been controversial since the archaic 
period because they were perceived, and sometimes intended, to dis-
place the divine prerogatives and undermine traditional religion. These 
controversies intensi"ed throughout the classical and Hellenistic 
periods.
Aristotle established meteorology as a science. Whereas his 
predecessors had discussed meteorology in all- encompassing cosmo-
logical works, he conducted a systematic investigation devoted entirely 
to meteorological phenomena, entitled Meteorology (Meteôrologikôn).2 
Although he agreed that ‘meteorology’3 was continuous with natural 
inquiry, and although some of his contemporaries used the term inter-
changeably with ‘astronomy’, Aristotle carefully differentiated the 
subject from related ones,4 and described its unique methodological 
features. He speci"ed in his logical works how the practical- empirical 
and theoretical- explanatory parts of meteorological inquiry could 
be related to one another as sub- alternate sciences so as to produce 
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scienti"c demonstrations (apodexeis) and causal explanations (aitiai). 
And in the Meteorology he offered mathematical explanations of 
optical meteorological phenomena such as halos and rainbows that 
conform to his methodological standards. Aristotle also methodic-
ally collected the meteorological views of his predecessors; meteor-
ology comprises a signi"cant part of doxographical literature.5 Finally, 
Aristotle’s meteorology was immensely in#uential on the subsequent 
development of the science, beginning in the Hellenistic era, when 
his views were adapted even by competing schools of Epicureans 
and Stoics. Later meteorology was mostly written as commentary 
on Aristotle’s Meteorology well into the early modern period.6 As an 
in#uential historian of meteorology stated: ‘the system established by 
Aristotle remained for nearly two thousand years the standard text-
book of our science’.7
Astro- Meteorology and Weather Signs
In the astro- meteorological almanac in Works and Days, Hesiod 
structures his advice on farming and sailing according to risings and 
settings of prominent heavenly bodies throughout the solar year, begin-
ning with the harvest at the Pleiades’ rising (in early May); ploughing 
is supposed to begin when the Pleiades set (in early November). In 
between is ‘the season of toilsome summer … men are weakest, for 
Sirius parches their head and knees, and their skin is dry from the heat’.8 
Hesiod here refers to the position (in mid- July) of Sirius, the brightest 
star in the night sky, also known as the Dog- star.9 He recommends 
cutting wood around early October:  ‘when the strength of the sharp 
sun ceases from its sweaty heat, as mighty Zeus sends the autumn 
rain, and a mortal’s skin changes with great relief – for that is when the 
star Sirius goes during the day only brie#y above the heads of death- 
nurtured humans’.10 Under Sirius, the weather is hot and dry – Hesiod 
almost seems to imply that the position of the star is the cause of the 
dryness and heat. When Sirius changes position, the heat dies down, 
then Zeus causes rain.
More prosaic calendars, called parapêgmata, were originally 
inscribed on stones and erected as monuments in public places as 
instruments for tracking cyclical phenomena by means of a movable 
peg; specimens dating back to the "fth century BCE survive.11 Literary 
parapêgmata were written on paper. The following excerpts are from 
the parapêgma attributed to Geminus.12
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The Sun traverses Cancer in thirty- one days. The 1st day: According 
to Callippus Cancer begins to rise, summer solstice, and there is 
a change in the weather … 27th: … According to Eudoxus Sirius 
rises in the morning, and for the next "fty- "ve days the Etesian 
winds blow …
The Sun traverses Leo in thirty- one days. On the 1st 
day: According to Euctemon Sirius is visible, sti#ing heat follows, 
there is a change in the weather …
The Sun traverses Scorpio in thirty days … On the 4th 
day: According to Democritus, the Pleides set at the same time as 
daybreak, wintery winds for the most part, and cold, there is now 
frost, it tends to be wintery, trees really begin to lose their leaves.
As in Hesiod, the rising of Sirius is associated with summer and hot, dry 
weather. But the accounting is more speci"c and detailed, and covers a 
greater variety of phenomena, and authorities are cited, like in a modern 
scienti"c paper.
Democritus is one of the most frequently cited authors in literary 
parapêgmata.13 His predictions are usually accompanied by the quali-
fying expressions ‘for the most part’ (hôs ta polla) and ‘tends to’ (philei) 
(as in the above quotation), whereas the other authorities simply assert (as 
Hesiod did) that storms, winds, etc. do occur at the indicated time. These 
quali"ers indicate awareness of variation from the annual norm, and thus 
represent a more advanced concept of meteorology than is evident in the 
astro- meteorological parapêgmata based on "xed points in the solar year.
Pliny the Elder in general follows Hesiod in structuring 
recommendations for farmers according to the solar year, but he noted 
that ‘Democritus thinks that the weather through the winter will be 
the same as it was on the shortest day and the three days that surround 
it, and he thinks so too in regard to the summer and the weather at 
the summer solstice.’14 Democritus developed techniques of short- 
term weather forecasting, even for the weather of the next few days or 
hours,15 and was reputed to have been successful.16 Pliny reports that 
‘Democritus urged his brother Damasios, who was reaping his harvest 
on a very hot day, to stop harvesting and to gather what he had already 
cut and put it under cover. A few hours later his forecast was con"rmed 
by a "erce rainstorm.’17 Although his interest in these phenomena 
may have been largely theoretical, it may also have had other practical 
applications in addition to farming,18 including medicine.19
These developments in#uenced later literature on weather 
signs. The work On Signs,20 usually attributed to Theophrastus, was 
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probably based on a work by Aristotle of the same title, which was 
in turn probably based on a lost work of Democritus.21 In it certain 
meteorological phenomena are described as indicated by various signs 
(stars, sun, moon, comets, thunder, lightning, rainbows, halos, insects, 
birds, spiders, worms, frogs, and mammals). Within each section 
(in the order:  rain, wind, storms, fair weather), the signs are given as 
in the following:  ‘Often (hôs epi to polu), an iridescent halo shining 
either around or through a lamp is a sign of rain from the south’; ‘If it 
is not rainy at <the rising of> Sirius or Arktouros, there will be, for the 
most part (hôs epi to polu), rain or wind at the time of the <autumnal> 
equinox’.22 The general formula is:
If there is A <sign>, then (‘for the most part’) there will be B 
<signi"ed>.
It is notable that On Signs is arranged according to event signi"ed, not 
according to sign, which would be more useful for weather forecasting. 
This indicates a more theoretical purpose for collecting data on 
correlated meteorological phenomena than is evident in the astro- 
meteorology of Hesiod and the parapêgmata.23
Meteorology and the Inquiry into Nature
Hesiod frequently describes meteorological events as intentional acts 
of the gods.
Sailing is in good season … for "fty days after the solstice, when the 
summer goes to its end … You will not wreck your boat then nor 
will the sea drown your men – so long as Poseidon, the earth- shaker, 
or Zeus, king of the immortals, does not wish to destroy them; for 
in these gods is the ful"llment, both of good and evil alike. That is 
when breezes are easy to distinguish and the sea is painless: at that 
time entrust your swift boat con"dently to the winds, drag it down 
to the sea and put all your cargo into it. But make haste to sail back 
home again as quickly as possible, and do not wait for the new wine 
and autumn rain and the approaching winter and the terrible blasts 
of Notus, which stirs up the sea, accompanying Zeus’ heavy autumn 
rain, and makes the sea difficult.24
Homer too had held the gods responsible for meteorological events.25 
About a century after Hesiod, in the "rst prose books written in Greek, 
Anaximander began offering naturalistic explanations of the same 
meteorological phenomena. For example:
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Winds occur when the "nest vapors of the air are separated off and 
when they are set in motion by congregation. Rain occurs from the 
exhalation that issues upwards from the things beneath the sun, and 
lightning whenever wind breaks out and cleaves the clouds.26
Anaximander held that the earth was originally covered by water; the 
sun caused most of the moisture to evaporate away; the remaining 
salty part is the sea. The evaporation causes winds; winds enclosed and 
compressed by clouds eventually tear out, causing explosions, thunder 
and lightning. The model of the sun acting on the moist surface of the 
earth so as to cause a ‘vapour’ (atmis) or ‘exhalation’ (anathumiasis) 
was immediately developed by Anaximenes27 and Heraclitus as the 
basis for explanation of all meteorological phenomena.28 Heraclitus 
distinguished two exhalations, relating them to a series of elemental 
transmutations of "re, a view later adapted by Aristotle.29
By the mid- sixth century BCE Ionians were investigating every 
variety of meteorological phenomena mentioned in the epics, and had 
already developed competing explanations. Anaximander was also ‘the 
"rst to depict the inhabited earth on a chart’.30 He conceived not only 
of the shape of the entire earth, but also its relation to the stars, sun, 
and moon, and realised that earth has antipodes. His outlook was global 
and he offered his explanations in the context of a comprehensive cos-
mogony, zoogony, and anthropogony. The resulting ‘naturalising’ pic-
ture is as different from the ‘theologising’ one of Homer and Hesiod as 
prose is different from poetry.31 Nowhere is this difference more vivid 
than with respect to meteorological phenomena.
Against the background of astro- meteorology and parapêgmata, 
what stands out most in Anaximander and his successors is the con-
cern to explain the phenomena. Against the background of Homer and 
Hesiod, what stands out is the naturalistic and non- theological perspec-
tive of the explanations.32
There is little evidence about Anaximander’s, Anaximenes’, or 
Heraclitus’ knowledge of astro- meteorology or practical interests in 
weather signs. It is only with Democritus that we have clear evidence 
of interest in both the empirical- practical and explanatory- theoretical 
dimensions of meteorology.33 It is also with Democritus that the replace-
ment of intentional actions of the gods with natural causal explanations 
becomes an explicit programme.
Democritus also expanded the reach of meteorology to include both 
shorter- and longer- term phenomena. We already saw that Democritus 
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developed techniques of short- term weather forecasting. He also specu-
lated about changes in the global environment, asserting that the earth is 
warming up and drying out, causing overall sea levels to decrease.34 Such 
speculation was related to Democritus’ all- embracing physical theory. 
A papyrus records his view on how the sea came into existence:
in liquids, as in the universe as a whole, like is sorted out together 
with like as a residue of putri"cation and it is by this process of 
congregation of like elements that the sea and other salty substances 
are formed … Democritus says that the most astonishing and 
paradoxical works of nature come about in the same way, as there 
are not many differences among the elements composing the earth.35
We see a similar employment of explanatory analogy in his explanation 
of wind:
Democritus says that when there are many particles, which he 
calls atoms, in a con"ned empty space, the result is wind; on the 
other hand, the air is in a peaceful, still state when there are few 
particles in a large empty space. In a marketplace or street, so long 
as there are few people, one can walk without interference, but 
when a crowd converges in a con"ned area, there is quarrelling as 
people bump into each other. In exactly the same way, in the space 
surrounding us, when many particles have "lled a small region, 
inevitably they bump into each other, push forward and get pushed 
back, become entwined and get forced together.36
It is characteristic of Democritus to explain large- scale phenomena 
by analogy to small- scale ones. He also pioneered giving multiple 
explanations of meteorological phenomena, for example, earthquakes.37 
Such explanations were designed to remove the terror of natural phe-
nomena caused by the belief that gods in#ict them on humans as pun-
ishment.38 Democritus claimed that astonishment at meteorological 
phenomena caused belief in gods:
Some people think that we arrived at the idea of gods from the 
remarkable things that happen in the world. Democritus … says 
that the people of ancient times were frightened by happenings in 
the heavens such as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, conjunctions 
of stars, and eclipses of the sun and moon, and thought that they 
were caused by the gods.39
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Democritus offered to remove their astonishment and fear by explaining 
all such phenomena according to naturalistic explanations, thus obvi-
ating the perception of divine intervention.
The Backlash against Meteorology
In a lost play by Euripides, the trickster Sisyphus claims that a ‘shrewd 
and clever man invented for mortals a fear of the gods’ and
placed them where they might make the greatest impression upon 
human beings … where he knew that fears come to mortals … 
from the vault on high, where they beheld the shafts of lightning 
and fearful blows of thunder and star- "lled gleam of heaven … 
parade- ground for the brilliant mass of the sun and source of rainfall 
moistening the earth below.40
The speech evidently represents the views not of Euripides himself, but 
of naturalists like Anaximander and Democritus. Popular depictions of 
‘meteorologists’ con#ated them with healers and itinerant priests who 
claimed possession of wisdom unavailable through traditional state reli-
gion.41 Aristophanes’ Clouds, performed in 423 BCE, capitalises on this 
con#ation in a hilarious way. Strepsiades, desperate to relieve himself of 
debt, visits the ‘Thinkery’ where ‘meteoro- sophists’ offer to teach how 
to make the worse argument defeat the better; he encounters ‘Socrates’ 
suspended up high in a basket making ‘accurate discoveries about meteoro-
logical phenomena’.42 ‘Socrates’ is portrayed worshipping meteorological 
phenomena as if they were gods:  ‘O Lord and Master; measureless Air, 
who hold the earth aloft, and you, shining Empyrean, and ye Clouds, 
awesome goddesses of thunder and lightning.’43 He is even portrayed 
denying the existence of traditional gods, ‘disproving’ their existence by 
replacing Zeus’ rain and thunder with naturalistic explanations.44
Plato worked to de#ect such views from Socrates. In his Apology, 
Socrates is portrayed refuting the accusation that he is ‘a student of all 
the meteors and things below the earth’ (18b7– 8). Negative attitudes 
about ‘meteorologists’ persisted throughout antiquity.45 Plato was sen-
sitive to how they affected the perception of philosophy; his Socrates 
complains that ‘they mention accusations available against all 
philosophers, about the meteors and things below the earth, about not 
believing in the gods, and about making the worse argument the stronger’ 
(23d5– 7). In the Phaedo Socrates claims that only in his youth did he 
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dabble in meteorology, a passing interest he lost when disappointed by 
Anaxagoras’ failure to explain how the phenomena are caused by an 
intelligent mind (Phd. 96a– e). Aristotle too reports that Socrates (in con-
trast to Democritus) turned his attention away from natural phenomena 
and towards political affairs (Parts of Animals 642a24– 31; Metaphysics 
1078b17– 23).
Aristophanes falsely portrayed Socrates as a naturalistic philoso-
pher to brilliant comedic effect, but the meteorological explanations and 
characters he devised are closely modelled on the kind of explanations 
found in the doxography of early Greek meteorology, for example in 
‘Socrates’’ explanation of how clouds cause thunder:  ‘when they "ll 
up with lots of water and are forced to drift by necessity (di’ anagkên) 
sagging down with rain, then run into one another, and become sodden, 
they explode and crash’ (376– 8). Diogenes of Apollonia (ca. 425 BCE), a 
contemporary of Aristophanes, had made ‘air’ a leading cosmological 
principle, and apparently wrote a work dedicated to meteorology.46 
Anaxagoras and Empedocles were even more famous philosophers of 
this ilk, reputed for their ability to predict the weather.47
Plato mocks ‘meteorologists’ like Anaxagoras, and politicians 
who associate with them, like Pericles, in the Phaedrus (270a). In the 
Timaeus, he elaborates intelligent- design creationism, but conspicu-
ously leaves out central meteorological topics such as thunder and 
lightning, treating only hail and frost extremely brie#y (59de), in a 
‘diversion’ from ‘the things that always are, deriving instead a carefree 
pleasure from surveying likely accounts about becoming’.48 Later, he 
harshly condemns ‘meteorologists’, describing their devolution in his 
comedic reincarnation scheme:  ‘Birds as a kind are the products of a 
transformation … They descended from innocent but simpleminded 
men, men who were meteorologists (meteôrologikôn), and who in their 
naivety believed that the most reliable demonstrations concerning 
those things could be based upon visual observation.’49 Plato’s antipathy 
to meteorology was thus caused not only by the longstanding associ-
ation of meteorology with irreligious naturalism, but more speci"cally 
by the necessary dependence of meteorology on empirical methods.
Aristotle’s METEOROLOGY
Plato’s antipathy towards empirical science in general and meteor-
ology speci"cally stands in stark contrast to Aristotle. In the Posterior 
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Analytics Aristotle points out that the phenomena identi"ed by the 
empirical sciences can be explained by mathematical sciences.
It is for the empirical scientists to know the fact, and for the 
mathematical scientists to know the reason why; for the latter have 
the demonstrations of the causes (tôn aitiôn tas apodeixis), and often 
the mathematical scientists do not know the fact, just as those who 
study universals often do not know some of the particulars because of 
lack of observation … Related to optics as this is related to geometry, 
there is another science, that of the Iris. Here it is for the natural 
scientists to know the fact, and for the students of optics (either of 
optics simpliciter or of mathematical optics) to know the reason why.50
‘Empirical scientists’, then, state facts about Iris phenomena (e.g. halo 
or rainbow),51 while ‘mathematical scientists’ provide the explanations. 
This expression ‘empirical scientists’ is interesting because earlier in 
the same work Aristotle lays down stringent regulations for demon-
stration according to which mere observations of empirical facts would 
be considered insufficient for scienti"c knowledge. In 1.3 he holds that 
scienti"c knowledge can be expressed in the form of syllogisms which 
can be expressed in the following generic form:
If (1) A <major term> of every B <middle term>, [Major Premise] and 
if (2) B of every C <minor term>, [Minor Premise] then (3) A of every 
C. [Conclusion]
Aristotle’s explanatory syllogisms are more complex than the simple 
weather sign formula: ‘If there is A, then (for the most part) there will 
be B.’ With Aristotle’s syllogisms we are dealing with not one but two 
conditional propositions, as well as a third proposition (the conclusion) 
necessitated by them; and the propositions include three terms, not 
just two.
In the context of demonstrations involving mixed ‘empirical’ 
and ‘theoretical’ sciences, the empirical sciences are placed ‘under’ the 
theoretical ones in the technical sense of explanatory sub- alternation. 
The conclusion, which is the proposition stating a fact observed by 
an empirical science, is demonstrated by means of propositions from 
explanatory mathematical sciences.
For example, consider Aristotle’s explanation of the halo. 
Empirical meteorology identi"es the fact that the halo always appears 
as a full circle around a luminous body like the sun or moon. Another 
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science, which turns out to be a mixed mathematical- physical 
science called ‘mathematical optics’, in turn explains these facts 
by supplying the cause for the phenomena. The explanation of the 
halo phenomenon is that in the clouds ‘tiny and uniform’ particles 
(ice crystals) are suspended and act as mirrors which re#ect (prisms 
which refract, actually) sight- stream to (light from, actually) a heav-
enly body at a constant angle from a viewer, so that every particle at 
a certain angular distance (e.g. 22°) becomes illuminated, producing 
the appearance of a complete circle around the moon or sun. Optics 
thus provides the reason for the phenomena observed in the empir-
ical science of meteorology. Optics is in turn sub- alternate to geom-
etry, which supplies the immediate principle on which explanations 
in meteorological optics ultimately depend. Consider the following 
syllogism.
If (1) a circle is attributable to every "gure with limits all equidistant 
from a single point; and if (2) a "gure with limits all equidistant 
from a single point is attributable to every light re#ected by tiny, 
uniform mirrors; then (3) a circle is attributable to every light 
re#ected by tiny, uniform mirrors.
The major premise is a geometric de"nition of a circle. The syllogism 
gives a geometric explanation of the optical theorem stated in the con-
clusion. This conclusion can in turn be used as the major premise in 
another syllogism explaining an empirical fact.
If (3) a circle is attributable to every light re#ected by tiny, uniform 
mirrors; and if (4) a light re#ected by tiny, uniform mirrors is 
attributable to every halo; then (5) a circle is attributable to 
every halo.
Thus the empirical fact about the halo, that it is circular, is explained 
on the basis of material and moving causes (re#ection of sight- streams 
by mirrors), and a formal cause (the geometrical de"nition of a circle). 
Aristotle’s explanation of the halo in Meteorology 3.2– 3 thus conforms 
to his strict account of scienti"c demonstration in the Posterior 
Analytics (where, as we saw, geometry, optics, and Iris phenomena were 
instanced as a paradigm of scienti"c sub- alternation).52
As the example shows, true observations of ‘empirical’ meteor-
ology are necessary but not sufficient for scienti"c knowledge, and can 
only contribute to knowledge when subordinated to theoretical and 
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explanatory sciences. At the same time, mere theoretical statements 
about the causes of meteorological phenomena (such as those that sur-
vive in our doxography of Anaximander) do not constitute scienti"c 
knowledge in Aristotle’s technical sense, since causal explanations must 
be wedded to empirical observations which produce the less well- known, 
posterior, and mediated conclusions. Otherwise the explanations would 
not be better known than, prior to, and explanatory of anything, that 
is, they would not have any subject matter for which they provide the 
demonstrations. Only the marriage of causal explanations to empirical 
data produces viable scienti"c knowledge. Democritus seems to have 
been the "rst to recognise this in practice; Aristotle, however, is to be 
credited with working it out in theory, indicating the logical form that 
meteorological arguments must take if they are to be scienti"c.
Aristotle recognises several kinds of causes as middle terms in 
scienti"c demonstrations, and in Posterior Analytics 2.11 he offers a 
meteorological example: ‘if it thunders, when the "re is extinguished, it 
is necessary for it to sizzle and make a noise, and also (if things are as the 
Pythagoreans say) it has the aim of threatening those in Hades in order 
to make them afraid’ (94b32– 4). Thunder is noise in the clouds, and this 
is explained by recognising it in the class of ‘"re- extinguishment’. Fire 
extinguishment in general causes a sizzling noise. Thunder can thus be 
explained as having a certain form, resulting in a ‘formal’ explanation.
What about the "nal cause explanation of thunder? The bizarre 
‘Pythagorean’ explanation embodies the archaic theology of Hesiod. 
Both the formal and "nal explanations could easily be formulated as 
syllogisms, but are both explanatory? Aristotle does not, of course, actu-
ally hold that thunder is caused by Zeus for the purpose of terrorising 
sinners in Hades. What the example shows is that the one kind of 
explanation (the ‘Pythagorean’) can be replaced with another (the 
‘formal’ explanation). It is not appropriate to explain every phenomenon 
by reference to every kind of cause, and many kinds of phenomena, such 
as eclipses, should not be explained by a "nal cause.53 Cases of mul-
tiple explanation involving material and moving and formal and "nal 
causes occur regularly and as a rule in his biological writings, but in the 
Meteorology Aristotle does not offer any "nal cause explanations – the 
absence of teleology is conspicuous and noteworthy.54 And in the Physics, 
Aristotle raises a famous aporia about such "nal cause explanations.
There is an aporia. What prevents nature from acting neither for 
the sake of something nor for the better, but just as Zeus makes 
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rain (huei ho Zeus) not in order to make the crop grow, but out of 
necessity? For what rises up must be cooled, and what has been 
cooled, having become water, falls down. This having occurred, it 
incidentally happens that the crop grows. And similarly, if the crop 
is destroyed on the threshing- #oor, it does not rain for the sake of 
this (in order to destroy the crop), but this happened incidentally.55
Aristotle argues that the kind of explanation given here (and elsewhere56) 
for rainfall, which refers only to material and moving causes (in describing 
a kind of evaporative cycle through elemental transmutation), is not suf-
"cient in the case of biological explanations, a point he reiterates in a 
methodological preface to the biological works (Parts of Animals 1.1). For 
example, absolute necessity cannot explain why teeth grow sharp in the 
front and broad in the back, thus reliably serving a clear purpose (biting 
and chewing). But rainfall is different: crops may either be helped or hurt 
by rain if not removed from the threshing #oor when a storm happens to 
come, as Democritus reportedly pointed out to his brother Damasios.57 
Absolute necessity is the cause of the evaporative cycle and thus of rain-
fall, but its effects may be bene"cial or harmful, depending on application 
or failure of human art. In the case of teeth, the same kind of absolute 
necessity cannot explain the inherent usefulness of the result, and so a 
different kind of necessity must be at work, which Aristotle in Physics 
2.9 calls ‘hypothetical necessity’, comparing it to the kind of ‘necessity’ 
employed in art. In neither case, however, can luck be the cause:
for teeth and all other natural things either invariably or for the 
most part (hôs epi to polu) occur in a given way, but of none of the 
results of luck or spontaneity is this true. And we do not think that 
it is the outcome of luck or concomitance that there is a lot of rain 
in winter, but only if there is a lot of rain under the Dog- star (hupo 
kuna); nor that that there are heat- waves under the Dog- star, but 
only if there is a heat- wave in winter.
(Arist. Ph. 198b36– 199a3)
In this second meteorological example in the aporia, Aristotle refers to 
the ‘empirical science’ of astro- meteorology which, as we saw, observes 
the fact that Sirius is accompanied by heatwaves. The question of how 
to explain such regularities is the subject of the Meteorology.
In the opening of Meteorology, Aristotle makes reference to his dis-
cussion of causes in the Physics when describing where meteorology "ts 
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into the overall scheme of natural science: ‘We have previously spoken 
about the primary causes of nature, and about all natural motion … 
There remains a part of our investigation that all our predecessors have 
been calling meteorology.’58
Meteorology is concerned with those incidents that are natural, 
though more disorderly (ataktoteran) than that of the "rst of the 
elements of bodies. They take place in the region nearest to the 
motion of the stars. Such are the Milky Way, and comets, and the 
movements of meteors. It studies also all the affections we may 
call common to air and water, and the kinds and parts of the earth 
and the affections of its parts. These throw light on the causes of 
winds and earthquakes and all the consequences the motions of 
these kinds and parts involve. Some of these things we are puzzled 
about, while others we can touch on in a way. Further, the inquiry is 
concerned with the falling of thunderbolts and with whirlwinds and 
"re- winds, and further, the recurrent affections produced in these 
same bodies by concretion.
By ‘more disorderly than that of the "rst of the elements’, Aristotle 
is referring to the motions of the stars in the ‘upper’ region (including 
the outermost ‘"xed’ stars, planets, sun, and the innermost celestial 
body, the moon), all which he takes to be composed of a special element 
(‘ether’), the natural motion of which is circular.59 The categorical dif-
ferentiation of the area beyond the moon as immutable, eternal, and 
perfect stems from Pythagoreanism, and the idea that phenomena close 
to the earth involve ‘more disordered’ things is present in Plato’s dis-
tinction between accounts of ‘the things that always are’ and ‘likely 
accounts about becoming’ (Timaeus 59c– e).
In the region below the moon, Aristotle holds that things are 
composed of four different elements and do not move in orderly circles 
but rather in two ‘more disorderly’ ways:  (1) they move rectilinearly, 
"re and air naturally upwards away from earth as a result of their rela-
tive lightness, and water and earth downwards, towards earth, thanks 
to their relative heaviness; and (2) they transmute, as with air and water 
in the evaporative cycle. Aristotle stressed that the entire lower region 
is composed of these four elements, and it is ‘their incidental affections’ 
(ta sumbainonta pathê) that is the subject of meteorology (339a20– 1). 
This strict differentiation between the heavenly and meteorological 
spheres precludes the earlier view, held by Anaximander, Heraclitus, 
and others, that the exhalations from the earth ‘feed’ the heavenly 
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bodies, and it allowed Aristotle to envision a completely terrestrial 
evaporative cycle.60
The elements are the material cause of all meteorological phe-
nomena. The motions and changes in the terrestrial region are con-
tinuous with those in the celestial, ‘which therefore steer every 
potentiality of it’ (339a22– 3); in this way the movement of the celestial 
element is the primary moving cause for all motion in both regions. 
Most important is the movement of the sun, which melts the upper-
most terrestrial region, also called the ‘tinder’ region (340b10– 15). In 
this way, heat is communicated downwards to the water and earth, 
giving rise to two different kinds of ‘exhalation’ (anathumiasis): one 
arising from the water, which is ‘more vaporous’ and wetter; and 
another from the air, which is ‘more windy’ and drier, like smoke. The 
moist (hugra) and dry (xera) exhalations never exist in pure forms but 
are always mixed, and we name a particular exhalation on the basis of 
which quality predominates (2.4.359b28– 32). The moist exhalation is 
heavier and so naturally falls below the drier and lighter, and the result 
is two strati"ed regions we identify with the regions of air and "re. The 
‘tinder’ region, being hot and dry, frequently bursts into #ame, causing 
several kinds of meteorological phenomena which differ according to 
the position and quantity of in#ammable material: ‘shooting stars’ (1.4), 
aurorae (1.5),61 comets (1.6– 7), the Milky Way (1.8). The lower regions 
include a great intermixture of air and water, and are also affected by 
the sun: as the sun approaches and recedes from earth, its heat produces 
dissolution and composition of materials, resulting in the generation 
and destruction of terrestrial things, meteorological, mineralogical, 
and biological. The sun causes water near the surface of the earth to 
be heated and thus become lighter and to rise upwards, turning into 
air, at which point it rises further until it cools and condenses, turning 
back into water, becoming heavy, and falling to earth as rain (1.9.346a). 
The same moist exhalation causes clouds and mist (1.9), and, under 
certain circumstances, dew and frost (1.10), snow and hail (1.11– 12). 
The dry exhalation is the cause of wind (2.4), and when trapped inside 
the earth, earthquakes (2.8), and when trapped inside a cloud, thunder 
(2.9); extremely large quantities of dry exhalation cause hurricanes, 
typhoons, "re- winds, and thunderbolts (3.1).
Aristotle insists that the exhalations are twofold (341b8). The 
Ionians explained meteorological phenomena by a single exhalation 
undergoing a linear and unidirectional transformation. Aristotle updates 
the theory to "t with his doctrine of elements. Although the result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monte Ransome Johnson174
174
might not fully cohere with the theory of elements in other works, 
Aristotle can be interpreted as virtuously developing an independent 
science of meteorology with its own appropriate principles, combining 
the doctrine of elements and the doctrine of exhalations in a creative 
and in#uential way.62 The fact that in so doing he elaborates his views 
largely by way of criticising his predecessors shows us a lot about his 
scienti"c method in general.63 Aristotle invokes several new kinds of 
information to defend his views over earlier theories. For example, he 
brings in the results of recent astronomical research to support his view 
of the structure of the cosmos and the nature of the exhalations. He 
also brings new empirical observations, including some of his own, to 
support his own theories and refute those of his predecessors.64 He also 
brings in recent geographical researches to support his account of rivers 
and terrestrial waters (1.13) and of the size and shape of the inhabited 
world (2.5).
The result is an astonishingly ambitious attempt to comprehend 
the meteorological situation of every region of the terrestrial globe 
and the universal history of its climatic and geographic changes (1.14). 
Aristotle for the "rst time divided the globe into "ve zones by refer-
ence to the heavenly sphere, a fruitful methodology for scienti"c cli-
matology.65 The term clima, which means ‘slope’, referred originally to 
the inclination of the earth’s axis with respect to the plane of the local 
horizon,66 and later to one of the zones de"ned by two lines of latitude of 
the earth, beginning with the "ve zones of Aristotle. The term ‘climate’ 
has become identi"ed with the meteorological conditions prevailing in 
any zone of earth over a long period of time. Aristotle used his division 
of the earth into zones to speculate about the global climate, including 
the north and south poles, and he also discussed differences in climate 
on the basis of longitude, speculating about the extreme east or west of 
the ‘habitable zone’. To reason about these far- off places, he employs 
both ‘demonstrative calculation’ (logos deiknusin), meaning mathem-
atical techniques, and empirical ‘facts known to us from journeys by sea 
and land’ (362b15– 20).
Aristotle asserts that ‘one area does not remain earth, another sea, 
for all time, but sea replaces what was once dry land, and where there is 
now sea there is at another time land’.67 The process, he insists, occurs 
in accordance with an order (taxis) and a cycle (periodon). He explains 
why the changes escape our notice:  ‘because the whole natural pro-
cess of the earth’s growth takes place by slow degrees and over periods 
of time which are vast compared to the lengths of our life, and whole 
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peoples are destroyed and perish before they can record the process from 
beginning to end’.68 War, disease, and famine destroy civilisations, and 
break others up by forcing migrations; environmental changes cause 
catastrophic agricultural failures that make people move or die out. 
People tend to settle in places that are wet and do not perceive the 
gradual change of the place to marsh and then desert:  ‘the advance is 
gradual and takes a long time, so that there is no record of who the "rst 
settlers were or when they came or in what state they found the land’.69 
He goes into a fair amount of detail about Egypt and Greece.
Up to this point Aristotle seems to be adapting Democritus’ 
account, according to which the whole earth is in a process of warming 
and drying up, causing lowered sea levels that will eventually result in 
the drying up of the whole sea (352a; cf. 356b10), a view that Aristotle 
contemptuously dismisses in giving his own account of the origin, 
saltiness, and future of the sea (2.1– 3). Aristotle criticises the unidir-
ectional picture of ‘global drying’:  ‘it is true that there is an increase 
in the number of places that have become dry land and were formerly 
submerged; but the opposite is also true, for if they look they will "nd 
many places where the sea has encroached’.70 New empirical evidence 
is used to con"rm the existence of both deserti"cation and sea- level 
rise. Again, these processes are cyclical and ‘just as there is a winter 
among the yearly seasons, so at "xed intervals in some great period of 
time there is a great winter and excess of rains. This does not always 
happen in the same region of the earth.’71 This is clear evidence that the 
ancients comprehended the reality of global and cyclical climate change 
(one is tempted to translate ‘great winter’ as ‘ice age’), and the threat it 
poses to human civilisations through deserti"cation and soil erosion, 
rising sea levels and cataclysmic #ooding.
Like Democritus, Aristotle discusses long- term climate change 
in addition to regular seasonal variation of weather. The dry and moist 
exhalations cause wind and rain respectively. The sun approaching 
the earth draws up the moist exhalation with its heat, and receding 
condenses the vapour due to cold; being cold, the vapour falls down-
wards as rain; this, Aristotle explains, is why there is more rain in the 
winter than summer, and during night than daytime (359b34– 360a3). 
A parallel process working through the dry exhalation is the cause of 
winds. Variation in weather (especially rain and wind) is to be explained 
on the basis of which exhalation predominates, the moist or the dry, and 
so this is also the basis of explaining drought (360a34– b5). For example, 
calm weather around the rise of Orion (early July) is due to the fact that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monte Ransome Johnson176
176
the heat of the sun has scorched up and dispersed both the moist and 
dry exhalations, so that it neither rains nor is windy (2.5.361b14– 30). 
Similarly,
the Etesian winds blow after the summer solstice and the rise of 
the Dog- star <i.e. Sirius>; they do not blow when the sun is at its 
nearest nor when it is far off. They blow in the daytime and drop at 
night. The reason for this is that when the sun is closer it dries the 
earth too quickly for the exhalation to form.72
Here we have the official moving and material cause explanations of 
the data contained in astro- meteorological parapêgmata, and specif-
ically of the phenomena used as an example in Physics 2.8. Notice 
that in accordance with his solution to the aporia about "nal cause 
explanations, Aristotle refers only to material and moving cause 
explanations of rainfall and heatwaves in the Meteorology.
All phenomena explained by exhalations are real products of the 
action of the sun’s heat on elemental materials, but Aristotle also iden-
ti"es meteorological phenomena that are actually optical illusions, 
including halos (3.2– 3) and rainbows (3.4– 5).73 This is one of the 
most innovative aspects of his meteorology.74 The explanation of the 
halo, discussed above, is particularly fascinating because it is a sub-
lunary object that appears to be perfectly circular, like the objects in 
the celestial realm. Such phenomena were treated in archaic thought 
as prerogatives of the gods, as were rain, thunder, etc. Xenophanes 
asserted that ‘Iris’ (i.e. the cause of rainbows and halos) was actually 
a cloud.75 Anaxagoras is credited with "rst recognising ‘re#ection’ of 
the sight- stream as from a mirror (what turns out to be refraction of 
light from a prism) to be the cause of such phenomena.76 Aristotle con-
tinues in this tradition by classifying the phenomena, outlining the out-
standing problems and alternative explanations, bringing new empirical 
observations and new explanatory theories to bear, and by applying 
geometry and optics. His explanations are the earliest ones we have 
to be accompanied by lettered geometric diagrams, diagrams that were 
utilised throughout the Renaissance and early modern science, and are 
still utilised (though with some important modi"cations) in contem-
porary textbooks of meteorological optics.77
By contrast, less successful aspects of Aristotle’s meteorology 
show him classifying two kinds of phenomena as meteorological which 
today we regard differently: the "rst are geological, namely metals and 
minerals; the second are astronomical. The second kind of con#ation is 
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not very surprising, given the meaning of the word ‘meteor’, but it is 
more problematic because the alternative theories available to Aristotle 
seem better. Aristotle was compelled by his assumptions to posit that 
rectilinear shooting stars (what we now call ‘meteors’, using the name 
of the genus for this species) were not celestial but rather sublunary phe-
nomena. Aristotle was partially right about this: although meteors ori-
ginate from outer space, they only become visible when falling through 
the earth’s atmosphere where they burn up. But in the case of comets 
and the Milky Way the same assumptions led Aristotle astray. The 
Pythagoreans and others held that comets were planets that only appear at 
long intervals (342b29– 343a1). Aristotle dismisses these views and offers 
two explanations of his own, recognising two different kinds of comets.78 
The explanations may cohere with the principles of Aristotle’s meteoro-
logical theory, but they involve him in many absurdities, as ancient 
commentators pointed out.79 Theoretical convictions about the unchan-
ging celestial region may also have clouded Aristotle’s observations (and 
those of other Greeks), leading to a failure to recognise astronomical 
phenomena like novae and supernovae.80 The methodological remark 
with which Aristotle prefaces his account of comets was thus very appro-
priate: ‘We think that we have adequately explained things unapparent 
to sensation if we have referred them to what is possible’ (344a5– 7). This 
remark has had considerable resonance in the philosophy of science.81
Hellenistic Meteorology
Given Aristotle’s statement of caution about meteorological explan-
ation, and living in our own age of ‘climate scepticism’, we might 
expect that ancient sceptics showcased meteorology as a subject of 
ever- clashing dogmatisms, "lled with doubts which call for suspension 
of judgement. In fact, we do not "nd them casting any doubt on astro- 
meteorology or meteorology whatsoever. Even the Pyrrhonian sceptic 
Sextus Empiricus seems to accept astro- meteorology as a valid science, 
contrasting it with the pseudo- science of astrology.82
In accordance with Aristotle’s statement that we must accept 
‘adequate explanations’ that refer to ‘what is possible’, meteorology 
ended up one of the least dogmatic and contentious areas of Hellenistic 
physics, at least with respect to individual explanations (not, however, 
in the interpretation of the theological implications of the explanations). 
Consider Theophrastus’ treatise Meteorology (or Metarsiology).83 
Theophrastus brie#y lists multiple causes for several phenomena:  of 
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thunder seven, of lightning four, of clouds two, etc. Theophrastus seems 
to enumerate every possible explanation for a given phenomenon.84 
Some have interpreted Theophrastus’ work as a collection of earlier 
opinions (a doxography), but Theophrastus may endorse each multiple 
cause, either because he identi"es several species of thunder, lightning, 
etc., or because he acknowledges an inability to demonstrate the de"nite 
cause, so that each of the explanations remains possible, none necessary.
Although for early stoicism we have only a summary of their 
meteorological views, Aristotle’s in#uence is evident.85 The fragments 
of Posidonius’ work on meteorology indicate that his views, which were 
decisive for later Stoicism, were also heavily in#uenced by Aristotle.86 
Seneca’s Natural Questions frequently references Aristotle, usually 
in agreement. This was the longest and most detailed investigation of 
meteorological topics surviving antiquity after Aristotle’s Meteorology, 
and was the main source for meteorology in the Latin Middle Ages.87 
Seneca’s explanations of particular phenomena are consistent with the 
foregoing tradition in being naturalistic.88 But his overarching goal is to 
support a Stoical conception of the relationship between humans and gods, 
and to demonstrate the importance of god in creating and maintaining 
the cosmos.89 Seneca thus interweaves his meteorology with theological 
and moralistic digressions completely alien to Aristotle.90 Following 
Posidonius and earlier Stoics, Seneca accepted the validity of divination 
by comets and lightning.91 These are not just vestiges of archaic views 
about meteorology, but a concentrated attempt to revive a theological 
view of the world. Whatever its other merits, however, Seneca’s work 
did not advance meteorological science much beyond Aristotle.92
But advancing meteorological science was unlikely to have been 
the point. Like the Pseudo- Aristotelian On the Cosmos,93 which may 
have in part been a response to Epicurus’ Letter to Pythocles, Seneca’s 
Natural Questions is probably best interpreted as a literary ‘riposte’ to 
Lucretius’ Epicureanism.94 Lucretius’ didactic epic On the Nature of 
Things represents a thoroughgoing Epicurean naturalistic account of cos-
mology and meteorology designed to liberate us from the fear that the 
gods control nature. According to Epicurus, we undertake natural inquiry 
only to free ourselves from fear. In a letter to a disciple, he advises:95
Do not suppose that there is any purpose to knowledge of 
meteorological phenomena (ta meteôra), whether considered in 
conjunction with other things or in their own right, other than 
tranquility (ataraxia) and "rm conviction, just as with everything 
else … Everything goes smoothly and in conformity with the 
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phenomena as long as everything is accounted for according to the 
multiple method, as long as we accept, reasonably, what is said with 
plausibility about them. But whenever one accepts one theory and 
rejects another that is equally consonant with the phenomena, it is 
clear that he deserts all genuine science and falls into myth.
For Epicurus, giving naturalistic explanations is all that is required 
of meteorology, so long as they are plausible enough to displace fears 
about the gods.96 Furthermore, we need not (and should not) arrive at 
a single de"nitive explanation, rather we should enumerate as many 
explanations as are plausible and "t with our naturalistic assumptions; 
‘exclusion of myth is the sole condition necessary’.97
For Aristotle, by contrast, meteorological inquiry is undertaken 
not primarily for a practical purpose but for the sake of theoretical know-
ledge. Just because an explanation can dispel fear does not qualify it as a 
good explanation; Aristotle criticises both mythic accounts and natural-
istic accounts that he thinks are implausible. Responding to Democritus’ 
multiple explanations for earthquakes, Aristotle offers his own uni"ed 
account in 2.8. While Aristotle explains multiple species of phenomena, 
e.g. several kinds of comet, and allows that there may be multiple causal 
factors involved in a single explanation (e.g. material and a moving 
causes), he does not allow multiple independent explanations of the very 
same phenomenon: he offers exactly one explanation for every meteoro-
logical species that he identi"es, even while acknowledging that we may 
only "nd ‘adequate’ explanations that refer to ‘what is possible’.
Epicurus, however, berates those who insist on a single explan-
ation: ‘to supply one cause for these facts, when the phenomena suggest 
that there are several different explanations, is the lunatic and inappro-
priate behavior of those who are obsessed with a pointless astronomy 
and of certain others who supply vain explanations, since they do not 
in any way liberate the divine nature from burdensome service’.98 So, 
for example, Epicurus offers multiple possible explanations of comets,99 
including the Aristotelian one (that comets are an in#ammation in the 
upper atmosphere), and one Aristotle rejects (that they are planetary phe-
nomena, connected with the heavenly bodies). Both are offered as plaus-
ible explanations in an extremely non- committal way. Since Epicurus 
does not accept that the celestial and terrestrial regions are composed 
of fundamentally different kinds of matter, he is not constrained by 
Aristotle’s presuppositions. In a contrasting case, Epicurus offers mul-
tiple explanations of the halo but not the (correct) one given by Aristotle, 
presumably because it would con#ict with his own assumptions about 
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the nature of sensation.100 But Epicurus accepts any and every natural-
istic explanation that can be adapted to his own principles.
What he does exclude are any theological or mythological 
explanations. Epicurus’ naturalistic meteorology stands at an opposite 
extreme from the theology of the early archaic period, according to 
which gods cause meteorological phenomena in order to bene"t or harm 
humans. In the centuries after Anaximander, both the empirical inquiry 
into weather signs and the theoretical explanation of meteorological 
phenomena were developed, and eventually integrated by Democritus. 
Aristotle embraced meteorology in his own physics and put the long- 
developing inquiry on a basis of scienti"c methodology. Whatever role 
the divine plays in his wider cosmology and metaphysics, Aristotle’s 
meteorological explanations are purely naturalistic, and involve no tele-
ology whatsoever. The Epicureans had merely to extend this philosoph-
ical tradition and did not feel the need to refute alternative explanations. 
Thus Epicurus seems to have borrowed directly from Theophrastus’ work 
and to some extent may be following his practice of offering multiple 
explanations,101 and he could also rehabilitate some earlier explanations 
rejected by Aristotle, beginning, of course, with those of Democritus. 
Some of his explanations of meteorological phenomena are unique and 
pioneering,102 but Epicurus does not harp on these dogmatically.
The main purpose of Epicurean meteorology was to use natural-
istic explanations to obviate the need for traditional theology. This is 
exactly what Lucretius aims to do in On the Nature of Things, and this 
in turn is what Seneca tried to counteract in his Natural Questions. 
The story about the origin of meteorology as a science (though per-
haps not as philosophy) ends here, but the legacy of ancient meteor-
ology continues in the fact that we still conceive of meteorology as 
an integrated empirical and explanatory science, and in many ways a 
mathematical science, one with both theoretical and practical aspects 
and implications. With the recent controversies over global climate 
change, something ancient scientists had already acknowledged as fact, 
we also see that the ideological controversies connected with meteor-
ology remain an important part of the story.
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he will change his mind, learning that astronomy contributes no small part to 
medicine, but a very great part. For along with the seasons changes the diseases 
and the digestive organs’ (2.21– 26, trans. Jones 1923). Democritus very likely 
in#uenced the author of this text. See now Liewert 2015, 41– 2, who presents a 
comprehensive study of the history of meteorological medicine.
 20 Sider 2002, 293– 7.
 21 Sider and Brunschön 2007, 42. According to a gloss in the list of Democritus’ 
writing, the work entitled The Great Year, or Astronomy included a parapêgma. 
The text reads Megas eniautos ê Astronomiês parapêgma (Diog. Laert. 9.48). Sider 
2002, 298– 9 convincingly argues that the term parapêgma was inserted as an edi-
torial comment and was not part of the original title.
 22 From sections 13 and 23 of On Signs, trans. Sider and Brunschön 2007; on the for-
mula, see 34– 5.
 23 Sider and Brunschön 2007, 30, 37.
 24 Hes. Op. 663– 70, trans. Most 2007.
 25 E.g. Il. 16.385– 8; Od. 14.300– 5.
 26 Hippol. Haer. 1.6.7, trans. KRS. See also Aëtius 3.3.1– 2; Sen. QNat. 2.18.
 27 Arist. Mete. 365b6; Theophr. apud Simpl. in Phys. 24.22; Aëtius 3.3.2.
 28 Clem. Al. Strom. 5.104.1– 3; Diog. Laert. 9.9– 10.
 29 Kahn 1960, 99, 109, has thus argued that meteorology was a remarkably conser-
vative line of inquiry stemming from the tradition of Anaximander. See also Taub 
2003, 9– 10; Mourelatos 2005, 285. See Wilson 2013, 54– 60, for an interesting and 
more nuanced view of the in#uence of Heraclitus on Aristotle.
 30 Agathemerus 1.1, trans. Kahn 1960, 82.
 31 The concept of nature is absent from Homer and Hesiod. Aristotle distinguishes 
between those who frame accounts of the gods (theologeô, 983b29), like Hesiod 
(984b27– 9), and those who frame accounts about nature (phusiologeô, 988b27), called 
‘naturalists’ (phusiologoi, 986b14, 989b30, 990a3, 992b4). See Kahn 1960, 4 n. 1.
 32 It is possible that Anaximander imbedded his naturalistic accounts in a larger 
cosmological framework in which justice plays a role; see the ‘fragment’ preserved 
by Simpl. in Phys. 24.17; Kahn 1960, 35– 9.
 33 On the empirical side are Democritus’ contributions to the parapêgmata litera-
ture, mentioned above. On the explanatory side, he wrote a work On Nature, as 
well as works on ‘causal explanations’ (aitiai) of things in the ‘heavens’, of ‘airs’ 
(aerioi), of ‘surfaces’ (epipedoi, sc. of the earth), and of ‘"re and things in "re’.
 34 Arist., Mete. 356b; cf. 353b.
 35 DK68A99a = Hibeh Papyrus 16.62, trans. Taylor 1999, 102– 3.
 36 Sen. QNat 5[4] .1.2, trans. Hine 2010.
 37 Arist., Mete. 365b1– 6; Sen. QNat 6.20.1– 4.
 38 Democritus described the end of natural science as ‘removal of astonishment or 
wonder’ (athaumastia) and ‘not being shocked’ (athambia), not being disturbed 
(ataraxia), and not being upset (anekplêktos). See Cic., Fin. 5.8.23; Strabo 1.61; 
Stob. 3.5.74; Euseb., Praep. evang. 14.27.4.
 39 DK68A75 = Sex. Emp., Math. 9.24, trans. Taylor, 140. See also Philodemus, On Piety, 
P.Herc. 1428, fr.16.2– 11; Lucr. DRN 5.1186– 94; Clem. Al., Protr. 68.5, Strom. 5.102.
 40 The translation is by Kahn 1997, 247– 8.
 41 Marciano 2006.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meteorology 183
183
 42 Ar. Nub. 228, trans. Henderson 1998.
 43 Ibid., 264– 6, trans. Henderson 1998.
 44 Ibid., 366– 71.
 45 For example, Lucian offers the following advice: ‘The common way of life is the 
best, and you will act more wisely if you stop doing meteorology (meteôrologein) 
and examining ends and origins, and repudiate those wise syllogisms and consider 
that sort of thing nonsense’ (Menippus 21, trans. Harmon 1961).
 46 Diogenes of Apollonia is credited with a work on meteorology by Simplicius, 
In Phys. 151.20. Jones 1923 goes too far in saying that the Hippocratic On Airs, 
Waters and Places is ‘derived’ from Diogenes.
 47 Anaxagoras (510– 428) had famously demonstrated weather prediction abilities by 
wearing a raincoat to a public event on a sunny day during which the weather 
indeed turned to rain (see Sider 2002, 287– 8). Empedocles (493– 433) reportedly 
claimed to be able to control the weather, and Gorgias supposedly witnessed him 
doing so. Gorgias remarks on ‘the meteorologists who, by removing one belief 
and replacing it with another belief, make things that are uncertain and unclear 
appear before the eyes of belief’ (Encomium to Helen 13 = DK82B11).
 48 Pl. Ti. 59d, trans. Zeyl 1997.
 49 Pl. Ti. 91d6– e1, trans. Zeyl 1997, adapted.
 50 An. Post. 1.13.78b34– 79a13.
 51 Iris was Zeus’ messenger in the Iliad; rainbows and halos are her prerogative (e.g. 
17.546– 552, 23.198– 211). Aristotle discusses Iris phenomena in Mete. 3.
 52 See further Johnson 2009.
 53 Metaph. 8.4.1044b8– 12; see further Johnson 2005, 156.
 54 Johnson 2005; Wilson 2013.
 55 Arist. Ph. 2.8.198b16– 23.
 56 An. post. 2.12.96a2– 7; Arist., De insomniis 3.457b31– 538a1; Mete. 1.9.346b16– 
31; Part. an. 2.7.653a2– 8; cf. Metaph. 6.2.1026b27– 35; Johnson 2005, 150– 6.
 57 See above n. 17.
 58 338a2– 26, trans. Webster 1931, adapted. The following inset quotation continues 
to 339a5.
 59 For an enlightening discussion of this distinction and the issues related to it, see 
Falcon 2005, 2– 13.
 60 Fritscher 2006, 798.
 61 On Aristotle’s successes in classifying ancient aurorae, see Stothers 1979.
 62 Wilson 2013, 37– 8.
 63 Freeland 1990.
 64 As has been shown with respect to comets and hail by Freeland 1990. Wilson 2013 
builds on Freeland’s point and shows this with respect to several other kinds of 
meteorological phenomena.
 65 The theory of zones may have originated earlier, with Parmenides. According to 
Strabo, ‘Posidonius says that Parmenides took the lead in dividing the earth into 
"ve zones’ (Strabo 94). The authoritative Bunbury 1883 states: ‘the division of the 
terrestrial globe into zones … [is] said to have originated with Parmenides, but … 
was developed in a more systematic form by Aristotle. It was the latter who "rst 
de"ned them in the sense in which they are understood by modern geographers’ 
(Bunbury 1883, II: 227); and Tozer 1964 concurs:  ‘Aristotle is the "rst writer in 
whom we "nd an attempt to determine these limits on scienti"c principles’ (179).
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184
 66 Neugebauer quoted in Taub 1993, 67– 8.
 67 351a22– 5, trans. Lee 1952, adapted.
 68 351b8– 13, trans. Lee 1952.
 69 351b25– 7, trans. Lee 1952.
 70 352a21– 5, trans. Lee 1952.
 71 352a28– 32, trans. Lee 1952.
 72 361b35– 362a3, trans. Lee 1952.
 73 See Boyer 1987; a magisterial history of the explanation of the rainbow. His dis-
cussion of Aristotle’s contribution is on 41– 65.
 74 Taub 2003; Johnson 2009; Stothers 2009.
 75 Aëtius 2.20.3.
 76 Aëtius 3.5.11.
 77 Johnson 2009.
 78 See Freeland 1990; Wilson 2013.
 79 E.g. Philoponus, In Meteorologia 97,22– 98,13, 113,34– 117,7 (citing Damascius).
 80 Lloyd 1996, 164.
 81 Hankinson 2013, 77– 8.
 82 Sext. Emp. Math. 5.1– 2.
 83 The work survives in Syriac and Arabic translation. For text, translation, and 
commentary, see Daiber 1992.
 84 For example, he remarks that ‘these are the causes by which lightning can occur’ 
(2.17, trans. Daiber 1992, 262).
 85 Diog. Laert. 7.151– 4.
 86 Kidd 1988, 84– 5; 1992, 294– 5; Fritscher 2008, 536. Alexander, In Mete. 3.3 expli-
citly says that Posidonius followed Aristotle’s explanation of the halo.
 87 Fritscher 2006, 798; 2008, 536.
 88 Hine 2010, 8, 139.
 89 Thom 2014, 1, 107– 19.
 90 Inwood 2005.
 91 E.g. Sen. QNat. 2.32.
 92 Graver 1999, 52– 4; Hine 2010, 7– 8. As Hine points out, the most important 
exception is his vigorous defence of the view that comets are planetary and not 
sublunary phenomena. Seneca’s work remains crucial for its preservation of 
earlier views, and is fascinating from the literary and philosophical standpoint, 
as Taub 2003 (141– 61), Inwood 2005, and Williams 2012 bring out well.
 93 See Thom 2014.
 94 Graver 1999, 51; Hine 2010, 5; Williams 2012, 9.
 95 Ep. Pyth. 85– 7, trans. Hankinson, 79– 80, adapted. See also RS 9.
 96 Taub 2009, 121.
 97 Ep. Pyth. 104.
 98 Ep. Pyth, 113, trans. Inwood.
 99 Ep. Pyth. 111.
 100 Namely, that sensations do not present illusions but reliable impressions that 
emanate directly from the surfaces of aggregate bodies such as clouds (see 
Johnson 2009).
 101 Sedley 1998a, 125– 6.
 102 E.g. the formation of ice (Ep. Pyth. 109).
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